NEWS TRANSCRIPT from the United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing
Nunn-McCurdy
certification.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Logistics, and
Technology Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge
Thursday, May 2, 2002 3 p.m. EDT
(Nunn-McCurdy explanation and certification documents are
available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020502nmc.pdf
)
ALDRIDGE:
So what do you want to talk about?
Q: First
of all --
ALDRIDGE:
Nunn-McCurdy.
Q: The
Crusader --
ALDRIDGE:
I'll talk about the Crusader in just a
second. A
couple of things I'll go over today.
And then I'll
open it up for questions.
The first thing I'd like to go over is the
Nunn-McCurdy
certification.
As you know, we have six programs that we have
to take a look at. And the certification process has to occur
by tomorrow. And I'll talk a little bit about
that, because I've
already done it. The other is the V-22 return to
flight, which
we've had a meeting on recently. I'd like to talk -- a couple
of things about the missile defense program, and
then the Navy
DDX. And
then I'm sure you'll have some questions on Crusader.
As you know, when we have a Nunn-McCurdy breach of
15
percent, we have to notify Congress. When we have a
Nunn-McCurdy breach of 25 percent, we have to
notify Congress,
and then the secretary of Defense has to certify
to four
criteria for the program to continue. The secretary has
delegated that certification process to me. And I -- as the
undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics.
The four criteria we have to certify to is, one:
is the
program essential for national security? The second criteria:
is there a -- is the management, or is the -- is
there an
alternative, equally capable alternative of lesser
cost
available?
The third criteria: is cost under control? And the
fourth criteria: are there management in place to
keep it under
control?
If the -- you have to certify that for the program to
continue.
If you cannot certify to those four criteria on a
specific date, then the fund obligation stops,
which is what
happened on Navy Area [sea-based missile system].
In accordance with this law, based upon the
schedule
that's been given for these six programs, I must
sign that
certification letter to Congress by May the
3rd. There's been a
huge amount of work done by the program offices,
by the military
departments and the OSD staff since the
congressional
notification had occurred. And because of all this work of
getting the programs back on track I am able to
certify that
each of the six programs now do satisfy the four
criteria for
continuation.
And I signed the certification letter to this
effect to Congress today.
Let me just go through, very briefly, some of the
programs that -- and the reason that I felt
confident of
certification.
One was the H-1 helicopter. We're re-manufacturing 280
H-1s for the AH-1 Cobra and for the UH-1 Huey,
replacements.
Based upon my review of the management team, we're
now using the
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] cost
estimates. In
fact, the Navy and OSD cost estimates were
consistent with each
other. And
if you look at the alternatives, there is a -- the
alternatives are much more extensive than
continuing with the
current re-manufacturing effort.
The CH-47 helicopter. We're going to re-manufacture 317
CH-47s for the heavy lift helicopter
replacement. Every
alternative was two to three times more
expensive. The CAIG
estimates -- Cost Analysis Improvement Group's
estimates are now
being used.
And looking at the management team we have in place
at Boeing, it looked like it had confidence that
they could pull
off the job.
The LPD-17 amphibious transport dock ship, there
are
four ships under contract leading to a 12-ship
buy. We have now
-- 95 percent of the design has been
complete. Most of the
problems are behind us. They are also using the
CAIG cost
estimate.
So it looks like we've got costs under control as
best we can determine.
The chemical demilitarization program. This is the
destruction of chemical weapons per our
treaty. There is really
no alternative to this approach, various
technologies on how to
do that, which we are looking at. And even though the program
is in place, we are looking at an alternative to
accelerate the
process to see if we can get rid of some of the
stuff quicker.
We are using the cost -- the CAIG cost estimates
for cost and
schedule.
The multiple-launch rocket system upgrades -- this
improves the launcher, develops a GPS-guided
multiple-launch
rocket system and extends the range. This is a joint program
between the Germany, Italy, France and the
UK. We have new cost
estimates and a reasonable production profile, and
the
contractor is now achieving good cost performance.
The last of the six is the space-based infrared
radar --
infrared system [SBIRS High]. This is the high version. This
is the replacement for the current ballistic
missile
early-warning system with the added requirements
for technical
intelligence and missile defense. This is essential for
national security. The alternatives were much more expensive
given the state of the current program. We are again using CAIG
cost estimates, and there's a new management
structure in
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman that gives me
the
confidence that we could pull this off.
So those are the six. They have been certified, and I
think for good reason. Again, a lot of work went into make
those happen.
On April 25th, the secretary of the Navy and the
commandant and I met to review the return to
flight status for
the V-22.
The program manager, Dan Schultz, and his team, with
a lot of additional help, have put together a
comprehensive
flight test program that will prove -- or not --
the
reliability, safety and operational suitability of
the V-22.
And I said before, this will be an event-driven
test program,
not a schedule-driven program. I concurred in the Navy's plan
to reinstate the V-22 flight test program. And I think the
first flight plan is for May the 9th.
I look thoroughly at this program. Some of the issues
that I had with the hover and high rate of decent
performance
are going to incur within the first nine months of
the flight
test program, even though it will start off very
carefully and
deliberately.
Missile defense.
As a result of many of the problems of
SBIRS-Low last year, I asked the Missile Defense
Agency to look
into a restructured program. This has now been completed. And
General Kadish has briefed a summary of the plan
to the Hill
several weeks ago.
Generally -- and let me summarize it -- we're
going to
form a joint contractor team of TRW and Specter
Mastro, the
former competitors. TRW will act as the prime for the
spacecraft design and development, and Specter
Mastro has agreed
to this arrangement.
We'll compete the payload between Northrop Grumman
and
Raytheon. We're going to implement spiral
development, evolving
the spacecraft capability with time. And by doing this,
starting off with a little slower pace, we can --
I believe we
can plan for the first increment to be launched in
the 2006 to
2007 timeframe.
We will ask Congress, through reprogramming,
for an additional $13.4 million in FY '02. As you recall, in
the appropriations process there was $250 million
left in the
program.
We're finding that that's just a little bit short for
what a restructured program would be, and we'll
ask Congress for
the reprogram.
It will come from a missile defense program
element itself.
And to avoid a lot of confusion between
SBIRS-Low and SBIRS-High, I'm going to ask General
Kadish to
give me another name for SBIRS-Low. That will probably save a
lot of time and effort.
As you may recall also, we terminated the Navy
Area
Terminal Defense System last December. I asked the Missile
Defense Agency to develop a replacement program to
account for
the new missile defense technologies. That work is also
completed.
I've been briefed on it. We have -- based on the
briefing and the information I got from General
Kadish, we have
decided not to start a new Navy Terminal Defense
System. We
found that through improvements in the Navy
Mid-course System,
the so-called Upper Tier, which is performing
quite well, and
some improvements in the existing Block 4 Standard
Missile, we
can achieve much of the capabilities lost as a
result of the
removal of Navy Area. And certainly we do not need anymore
pressure on our budget resulting from a new
start. So we're not
going to pursue that plan.
On Monday, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
John
Young, announced the source selection for the
Navy's new DDX.
I'd like to congratulate the Navy and the Gold
Team of Northrop
Grumman and Raytheon for an excellent design and a
winning
proposal.
The award of the DDX design agent contract marks an
excellent beginning for a new family of surface
combatants, for
littoral operations, land attack and air and
missile defense
capabilities.
This program is evolutionary in its final
development approach; will be a model for Navy
acquisition in
the years to come. It will bring transformational capability to
the fleet, as well as the acquisition
process. This is a great
new program for the Navy, and I wish them well.
Questions?
Q: Mr.
Secretary, as the V-22 starts flight testing
again, what standard are you going to use for
deciding if you
should cancel the program? If there's a crash, is that program
dead?
ALDRIDGE:
Not necessarily. It could be
pilot error,
mistakes.
We'd have to go into it and determine.
As you know,
there are really just three criteria that we're
looking for the
V-22: reliability, safety, and operational
suitability.
Operational suitability, of course, is a wide
range of things:
Will it operate well off of a ship -- deck of a
ship? Does it
have any landing-zone considerations, like dust
and debris? Can
it be dangerous to fly in that kind of
environment? Is the
performance what we expect it to be? As has been demonstrated,
there are some problems in going through.
If you read the blue-ribbon report and the
independent
NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration] study,
which I have done thoroughly, you'll find there's
some
recommendations -- many recommendations in there
to take a look
at some things like, do you need more control
authority? Some
of the hover performance that was predicted,
versus what was
actually achieved was different. I'd kind of like to know why
that occurred. Is something wrong with
aerodynamics
determination?
The prop loading is very high on the V-22, which
doesn't give it a lot of maneuverability
margin. We need to
check that out.
We've all talked about the vortex-ring-state
conditions that occur with these rotors --
especially when
they're out on 20-foot Mulman arms.
All those things are going to go -- be checked
very
thoroughly. The flight-test plan looks very good
to me. I was
worried that they were going to put the hard stuff
at the end.
They're not.
They're going to bring it up.
It's going to be
about nine months. They'll have some of the
high-rate-of-descent activities, as well as some
of the hover
performance, which is that uncertainty that I
mentioned. So I
think the program is well laid out. It's not -- again, it's not
schedule-driven; it's event-driven. And I think, based upon the
comments of the program manager, which I have very
high
confidence in, I think we're going to get a good
program. It's
going to prove itself one way or the other.
Q: But you
remain skeptical about the aerodynamics of
tilt-rotor technology, generally?
ALDRIDGE:
Yes. I think there's a lot of
uncertainties
we don't yet know about. Yes. And -- but I'm a
lone soul here
-- (laughs) -- in some cases, and the flight-test
program is
going to prove or disprove whether or not my
concerns are valid.
And the commandant of the Marine Corps now
concurs. He's very
-- he's going to watch that. And we're still looking at
alternatives, just to make sure.
Yeah.
Q: Using
as a baseline the transformation and the
availability or lack of availability of dollars,
two-part
question:
One, has the Pentagon, yourself included, decided to
cancel the Crusader program? We're not talking
about friends on
the Hill and what the Army may be doing, but has
DOD made that
decision?
And based -- again, not on the flight-testing of the
V-22, but again on transformation and costs and
dollars
available:
What about the program such as the V-22, the F-22,
the Comanche and the Joint Strike Fighter? Are they in doubt?
Are they firm?
How would categorize it?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, let me stop, back up a little bit. All
these things have come to the front because we're
in the process
of trying to publish a defense planning
guidance. We're trying
to get it out this week. It probably won't make it this week.
Maybe you can get it out on Monday, but when the
secretary goes
through the planning guidance and looking -- we're
getting --
preparing for the FY '04 and through '09 budget,
he's asked a
lot of questions about things like this. I mean,
you look the
budget:
Are all these things affordable? Are they the right
priorities?
We've listed a series of things we want to look at.
And Comanche is one of them, and F-22 is one of
them. And we
ask for making sure that we have an alternative
available to the
V-22. If
we have a problem with V-22, we don't want to be
siting around for another two years figuring out
what to do if
the V-22 isn't it, because the Marines need the
modernized
helicopter.
Q: Joint
Strike Fighter?
ALDRIDGE:
Joint Strike Fighter is certainly one of
those. You know, the Navy, Marine Corps has done a
study.
They've put that in. We've asked for some -- looking at
alternatives, to what is the right mix of those
because we
haven't made up our mind exactly. All these issues are now put
on the table for study. And that's what we've done.
We've
asked the Army, we've asked the Air Force, we've
asked the navy
to come in with studies at various dates, here are
some
alternatives, and we'd like for you to look at
this alternative
or that alternative. In some cases, we just say, "Give us a
plan, we don't have an alternative." Tankers.
We need to
replace tankers.
The Air Force has been asked: give us a plan
for how we're going to do tankers. These are the kinds of
things that we're looking at, and they have been
put on the
table. And
certainly we've asked the Army to look at an
alternative; if you didn't have Crusader, what
would you do, if
that's the case?
It's a plan. Give us a plan
under these
conditions.
No decision has been made because we haven't seen
the
results of the studies, and they have not been
briefed for the
secretary, the deputy secretary. And certainly they will go
into the budget planning process when we see the
studies
relative to the other priorities. So, no, we
haven't made any
decisions.
Q: Just a
follow-up. We have been led to believe,
I
assume perhaps incorrectly, that at least some of
these programs
were locked in concrete and were going forward,
particularly the
F-22 for the Air Force, which has stated it must
have it. Of
course, we know the Marines want the V-22; they
desperately say
they've got to have something to replace the aging
C-46s and
what have you.
But now we see these programs are not locked in
concrete, that there is a new view, perhaps. Has there been a
substantive change in the way these things are
being addressed?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, I don't think you could find any
program locked in concrete. I would imagine you would go back
and look at the CH-47 and the H-1 and LPD-17, and
somebody would
say those were locked in concrete in the past
before. If it's
not performing, it is certainly not locked in
concrete, in my
view. If
we find that there are better ways to do something,
I'm prepared to advise the secretary of Defense
that there's
better ways to do things and different
priorities. And I think
we have to. I mean, we owe the American taxpayer
this, to
provide as much use for the taxpayers' dollars as
we can get.
And I don't think there is any program that should
be considered
locked in concrete, unless you want to consider
the Pentagon.
(Laughter.)
This is probably the only place that's BRAC [Base
Realignment and Closure]- proof at this point.
Q: A last
follow-up, if I may.
ALDRIDGE:
Yeah.
Q: But the
F-22, I mean, are you saying in so many
words it's not performing up to your desirability
or others'?
That has been viewed, at least by the Air Force,
as an absolute
"must" to replace the F-15.
ALDRIDGE:
I think the Air Force view is exactly the
view that they have. The issue we have here is, are we buying
the right number of aircraft? Given now the Joint Strike
Fighter is underway, given the fact that we've
got, you know,
the F-18, been looking at the Navy's mix, to me
everything is on
the table to take a look at the balance, how many
we're going to
buy. Maybe
we're not buying enough. We've asked -- in the
study, we're looking at alternatives to include
increases in the
F-22 if that's the right -- (audio break).
Q: (In
progress following audio break) -- make sure
that I'm not shorthanding your views inaccurately,
my reading of
your previous remarks was that it could be
fundamentally and
fatally flawed.
That's one question.
The second, related question is, are you familiar
with
the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] report,
and what did
you think of it?
It's out.
ALDRIDGE:
I was briefed on the IDA report.
Some of the
concerns that they had are some of the ones I
had. Some of the
concerns that were in the blue ribbon panel
report, I had. Some
of the concerns that were in the independent
report, I had.
There are I don't know how many hundreds of
recommendations from
those studies to go out and look at other
things. They
highlighted this hover performance anomaly; what's
the
difference between predicted and achievable? We have not done a
lot of the test of the V-22 in combat maneuvering,
you know,
close to the ground and you're in a dangerous
area, you got to
get out -- we haven't done any of that. We haven't really done
a lot of landing and testing in sand and snow and
debris. We
haven't flown the envelope of this aircraft to
various points.
We haven't determined where we get into this
vortex ring state
problem thoroughly. I could just go on. We
haven't done a lot
of testing on shipboard capability with other --
Q: What's
the Aldridge opinion of the V-22 at this moment, realizing --
ALDRIDGE:
If it performs as predicted, reliably, safely
and operationally suitable and all those
conditions we've
outlined, then it has a transformational
capability on the
Marine Corps.
Q: But
didn't you have some doubts previously?
It
seemed to come through that way. Would "skeptic" be the right
word to --
ALDRIDGE:
Yes. I continue to be skeptic
until they prove to me those three things.
Q: But you
don't think it's fundamentally flawed?
ALDRIDGE:
I haven't -- don't see it fundamentally
flawed at this point. I will keep an open mind because there
are some things that it does in certain
performance that tell me
it's close to being marginal, and that is, for
example,
maneuverability at low speed. So I'm just going to -- look, I'm
going to -- I can't sit out here and make a
judgment that I
believe this thing is fundamentally flawed. I think there are
some problems with the V-22, and the best way to
find those out
is put it back in the flight test program and
wring it out. If
it's successful, I will give it full blessing, it
will go,
because it does have good performance, if it does
the things we
want it to do. So that's --
Q: Those
tests you mentioned, why weren't they done
earlier? I mean, this thing was going along pretty
well --
ALDRIDGE:
I wasn't here at the time. I
can't tell you.
Although, as you know, there were some -- a lot of
concern about
the hiding of some test results within the Marine
Corps.
Q: Don't
you think this is being pushed through too
quickly without having the adequate tests?
ALDRIDGE:
Likely to be. Likely had been a
little more
optimistic about its performance than -- ultimate
than it would
have been otherwise.
Q: Mr.
Secretary?
ALDRIDGE:
Yeah, please.
Q: Back to
the Crusader for a minute. Secretary
Rumsfeld said today that it's his intention -- and
that's the
word he used, intention -- to cancel the program,
although a
final decision hadn't been made. Now, in your view, is it
appropriate for the Army to continue to solicit
support for the
program on the Hill, knowing that the secretary
intends to
cancel it?
ALDRIDGE:
I did not hear the secretary's press
conference, so I don't know if he -- what he said
there. So I'm
assuming that you're right.
I think the Army should really be quite objective
in
this process, and we've asked the Army to come in
with a plan,
show it to us, that cancels the Crusader and see
what it looks
like, and let the secretary make up his mind as to
what are the
priorities for this department. And to be on the Hill lobbying
for a different approach, I think, is probably not
appropriate.
Yes, sir.
Q: A
follow-up?
Q: Did you
see the talking points they put out?
The
opening line said "A cancellation would put
soldiers at risk."
ALDRIDGE:
Let me just not comment on that, okay?
Q: Why?
ALDRIDGE:
Because I think it's something that the Army
should comment on, not some -- I didn't write
it. So I don't --
let them comment.
Q: Going
back to DPG [Defense Planning Guidance]-- a
follow-up on Bob.
The DPG will have, when it's final, a notice
to the Army to come back in 30 days with a program
that
cancelled the Crusader and look at alternate
programs like the
Excalibur.
Is that -- is that accurate?
ALDRIDGE:
I don't like to comment about what's in
classified documents, okay? Let me just say it in a very
general sense.
The Army has been tasked to come in with a plan
for -- for a plan that would include the
cancellation of
Crusader within 30 days, with a description of
what the concept
would look like with a lot of different variables
in it.
They've been asked to do that, Secretary White's
agreed to do
that, we'll come back, we'll brief the deputy
secretary in 30
days, and then we'll make a decision is this the
right plan, or
it may not be the right plan. It may be -- it may have some
warts on it.
It may not be right. It may be
that it's the
wrong way to go.
We're allowing the Army to tell us if that is,
in fact, the case, being as objective as possible,
to include
participation by my office and PA&E [Program
Analysis &
Evaluation] in this process so we have a basis for
an analytical
judgment based upon rational and objective
criteria. Okay?
Yeah.
Right here. Yes, sir.
Q: On
SBIRS-High, can you give us some of the details
about the changes made that have gotten it under
control? Does
any of it have to do with losing any capabilities?
ALDRIDGE:
No. We looked very thoroughly at
a -- as
part of the criteria I had to look at alternatives
to see if
there were any cheaper, better alternatives. And we did so. We
found that there were none. Given where we were in the
SBIRS-High, there were none that would give me the
confidence
that I would pick the alternative, versus the plan
that had been
put into SBIRS-High.
What gave me the confidence was that I think the
contractor realized that the performance and the
management
approach that he was taking for SBIRS-High needed
some serious
adjustment, and he took those measures to make
that happen.
The other one is that we've looked at the cost
estimates
for the future, and using our independent group,
and they came
to a conclusion that the costs obviously were
wrong that we were
using. The
Air Force agreed to use the independent cost in
their future, so the issue of cost uncertainty
went away to the
best we can.
I mean -- clearly, something could happen tomorrow
afternoon and blow up the thing. But given our best estimates,
the schedule and the cost estimates that were
being used by the
Air Force are what we think OSD and the
independent group said.
So given the alternative, what we were trying to
do --
the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- in fact, General
Myers came on very
strongly that this was essential for national
security to have
this capability as defined by the baseline
SIBRS-High. So we
left that program, in terms of its requirements,
alone. We
redid the costs, redid the schedule. The new
management scheme's
in place, and I think the message to the prime
contractors,
which are Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, is
that they're
in a spotlight.
And if we find that six months from now, the
program is going south, I have no hesitation to
pull the plug.
Q: Can you
just give us generally some of the
management differences now versus before?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, the -- some of the cost account -- the
cost -- earned-value management systems have been
put in place.
Some more senior leadership have been put in place
at Sunnyvale
and within Northrop Grumman. And -- let's see -- don't recall
all the other deals that -- I think the management
attention is
what's been given to the program with Vance
Coffman (Lockheed
Martin) and Kent Kresa {Northrop Grumman) basically signing up
that they will support and defend this program and
make it
happen properly.
Q: You
mentioned changing the name on SBIRS-Low.
Is
that a big deal?
What kind of problems have you encountered --
ALDRIDGE:
Probably just changing the stationery.
(Soft laughter.) It's got to be
--
Yes, way in the back.
Q: Sir,
could you tell us, in your own words, what the
problems are that you all see with Crusader? And could you also
through the Nunn-McCurdy list and give us the new
cost
estimates, and if you have them, what the changes
from the old
set?
ALDRIDGE:
They're in a letter that I sent to the
Congress. I probably out to let them see it before
I get -- pass
it out. But they all --
Q: (Off
mike.)
ALDRIDGE:
Yeah, the unit costs increases.
Yeah,
they're all spelled out in the letter to the
Congress, to the
various committees on the Hill. I don't know what the -- maybe
we can give it to you tomorrow, but we do have
(inaudible)
numbers.
And what was the other question?
Q:
Crusader -- your concerns with Crusader?
ALDRIDGE:
If you look into the battlefield -- I'm not
going to tell you we're going to -- again, it's
not a decision
to kill the program at this point. It's going to be reviewed.
The concern -- let me just give you kind of a
gross concern.
The battlefield of the future is going to be
represented by very
precise target location, digital terrain mapping
and very
precision weapons delivery. If you look at what is the best way
in the future to achieve a capability for the Army
that's in the
best interest, it is providing the Army with a
quicker pace to
achieve the technologies that are associated with
this type of
battlefield environment, get precision weapons to
the Army
faster; get the Army moving toward more mobility,
lethality,
deployability, which is what they're doing on the
future combat
systems.
If you then say to yourself, "What is the
Army doing
relative to moving toward that new
battlefield?" there's a $9
billion bill to pay for Crusader. And if you think about it,
you say, "Well, $9 billion is taking money
away from things that
could be used to get the Army toward more
precision, more
lethality, more mobility, more
deployability." And so there's a
question raised:
What should be the priority?
Should the
priority for Crusader at $9 billion to go, or
using $9 billion
to move the Air Force (sic) -- Air Force! --
(laughter) -- Army
-- mobility, I guess -- (laughter) -- move the
Army toward this
new technology at a faster pace.
The secretary of Defense has to balance those two
questions. He's asked the Army to provide that
balance for him.
"Tell me what we can do." An example of, should we build the
Excalibur -- which is a long-range, highly
precision weapon --
quicker by taking some of the Crusader money to do
that? And
the secretary of Defense has got a legitimate
question.
(Laughs.)
And what we have done is say, "This appears to be
attractive.
Let's go take a look at it."
Okay? "And come back
and tell us what you think."
(Cross talk.)
Q: The
Army says -- the Army says 11.1 billion.
Is the -- (inaudible.)
Q: Does
the Army plan (inaudible) Excalibur -- (inaudible.)
ALDRIDGE:
That's the total cost of the program.
We
have about 9 billion to go to completion, okay?
Yes?
Q: Yes, I
have a question about Navy Area. In a
similar roundtable here a few months ago, after
its
cancellation, you said that you could certify that
it was a
valid requirement for national security, but the
cost and
management were more problematic. But now, with it not being
revived -- I mean, Navy Theater Wide can't really
do what Navy
Area did.
So are you saying the requirement perhaps isn't as
important as it would seem before or simply that
it's not cost-
effective to pursue anything for --
ALDRIDGE:
The Navy Area was designed for the
shorter-range missiles -- a terminal defense
against a
shorter-range missile. The Navy Midcourse System is against
longer-range missiles. The Missile Defense Agency has looked at
these programs and has determined that they can
bring the Navy
Midcourse System down to a lower intercept
altitude and begin to
fill in the shorter-range missiles.
The other look is to take the basic standard --
the
Block 4 missile -- see if we can do something --
for example,
fusing or some other things -- to move its capability
up, so
that there may be some options to substitute for a
single system
associated with this block and to do it with
multiple
capabilities and looking at new kill
probabilities.
The other issue is whether or not you really
believe the
scenario is that valid that we would start a
brand-new program,
and that is, we will never be able to put a
land-based missile
defense system to protect a base, a port, other
than through
sea-based only, and begin looking at all of those
and just say
to yourself that it appears to be that would we
like to explore
this option of expanding what we've got with a
program that
looks pretty good -- expand its envelope to a
little -- to
shorter-range missiles, and to see if this is a
better solution
than starting a brand-new program that obviously
puts a lot of
pressure on the budget.
Yeah?
Q: Mr.
Secretary, can you clarify something about the
timing of your Nunn-McCurdy certifications? You said that --
speaking SBIRS-High, that six months from now, if
you find the
program's going south, you'll have no hesitancy to
pull the
plug. Does
that mean that you do these certifications in the
case of 25 percent use overruns every six months,
or what is the
timetable?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, what happens was the -- at any point during
these programs, if the program manager sees --
based upon the
selected acquisition report submission, that these
unit costs
are going up by the 15 -- they have to notify or
notify the
Congress and let us know that within a certain
period of time, I
have to re-certify. So that's a going process, but I think it's
triggered on the selected acquisition reports that
come in.
Q: And so
how come it is that this is the first time --
with the Navy Area, that there were any
decertifications or that
--
ALDRIDGE:
Why was it the first time?
Q: Yeah.
ALDRIDGE:
I think this is actually -- we actually found
another possible case. We're exploring -- where it happened in
1993. But I don't know whether people just
rubber-stamped this
stuff. I
wasn't here at the time, so I can't say.
That's not
my method, however. I will not sign my name at the bottom of
something that I don't believe.
Yeah, right here.
Q: Mr.
Secretary, you used the term "family of ships" for DDX.
ALDRIDGE:
Yes.
Q: In the
past, you, and I think Comptroller Zakheim,
have referred to it as an R&D [research and
development]
project, and it created heartburn for the Navy,
though, which
desperately wants to build the ship. So are you now looking at
this as the beginning of this family of ships the
Navy wants?
ALDRIDGE:
I don't find the Navy has any heartburn with
this program.
I think the Navy --
Q: No, I
mean they had heartburn over the way it was
being viewed by some of the higher level in the
building here
because it was being referred to as an R&D
project not a --
ALDRIDGE:
They may have -- okay. It is not
-- the
first ship will be an R&D -- built by
R&D. That's somewhat
unusual.
But it is -- in my view, it is a family of ships. I
absolutely support what the Navy is doing in
DDX. In fact, it
got -- I think the concept got derived sitting in
a meeting with
the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and the
secretary of the
Navy and myself in his dining room, that we
thought that there
was -- that DDX -- DD-21 was too narrowly focused
for where the
Navy was going in the future and that a much
broader range of
capabilities, starting with the technologies that
are quite good
with the new radar and the stealth design, and
robotics, and gun
systems and propulsion -- all that thing starting
with R&D, but
essentially branching out to the cruiser, to
littoral ships and
to some type of destroyer. So I fully support what the Navy is
doing.
Think they've got a great program.
Yeah, right here.
Q:
Secretary, can you say whether or not the experience
in Afghanistan was a factor in the battlefield of
the future
that you describe in weighing --
ALDRIDGE:
I think --
Q: -- the
Army's look at Crusader?
ALDRIDGE:
I'm not sure that would apply to a specific
program. I
think the battle in Afghanistan clearly pointed out
the value of integration of information,
technology, the role of
the soldier on the ground. I mean, lots of lessons learned.
But I think the value was the integration of all
this
information and how we could play it together from
the point of
view of the overhead space capabilities, to JSTARS
[Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], to
gunships, to
Predators, to P-3s -- all those things working
together that
were integrated, that was kind of a surprise to us
all, how well
that was working.
Yeah, right here.
Q: Yes,
sir, back to the F-22. There have been
reports
in the media recently that that program is high on
your chopping
block, on the Pentagon's chopping block, and also
reports about
possible structural problems. Could you describe that? Is that
a program that's in trouble?
ALDRIDGE:
I think the program is in -- from the point
of view of the technical progress, we are making
some progress.
The test plan is going a little slower -- test program
is going
a little slower than we would like. There have been reports of
a structural problem, and we were told about that,
I think, back
in December.
It doesn't bother me, because the -- that's the
reason you do tests, is finding problems. This event -- I know
Tony's sitting there on the edge of his chair to
ask another
question about that.
But it's a load problem on the fin at a particular
point.
It's a very narrow point in the flight test program. It
doesn't bother me because there's plenty of
mitigation things
that we can work on. That's why you do flight
tests. We'll find
out about it and we'll correct it.
The program -- the F-22 program, to me, is not in
trouble in the sense that it's likely to be
cancelled any time
soon. We
just started it into low rate initial production. I
think what we're looking at any alternatives is to
put the size
of the program that we're going to deploy
eventually rather than
the -- yeah, right here.
Q: A
couple months ago you asked a series of studies be
conducted looking at the industrial base in the
helicopter
industry. Those have been completed, and I think
you were
briefed on that.
What were the conclusions of those studies?
And I think some of the studies looked at how
possible
cancellations play out in terms of ramifications
on the
industrial base.
Were these factors in your decision to
recertify things like H-1 and the Chinook, and
also the V- 22
going forward now?
ALDRIDGE:
No. The studies concluded that
we don't have
as much competition in the helicopter industry as
we would like,
and that because of that, we are not innovating
enough. And
it's causing me to start thinking out how we can
be a little
more competitive in the helicopter about
base. It had a factor
involved in the H-1 program of can we do something
to be a
little more competitive and for some time in the
future; should
we be looking at new R&D programs for heavy
lift? So we're
beginning to think about what we can do in this
industry that is
essentially defined as three, Bell, Boeing and
Sikorsky, all
interconnected together in some way, shape or
form. And I don't
like that.
Q: Is it
also not the case that it's uncompetitive
because a lot of these programs are remand
programs, H-1, CH-47,
and they're all going back to the original
manufacturer?
ALDRIDGE:
Right. That's right. But if you look at the --
Q: How do
you break out of that cycle?
ALDRIDGE:
You have to start thinking about that now,
that you'll break out of it maybe in 10 or 15
years from now.
Yeah, way in the back.
Q: Yes,
sir. There have been about a dozen
alternative
studies for the F-22. Has something changed? Is
there some new
alternative to the F-22 that's being looked at or
are they the
same old alternatives?
ALDRIDGE:
I'm not --
Q:
Remanufactured F-15s, beefed up --
ALDRIDGE:
Those are not in the equation.
The only
thing that's in the equation today is how many are
we going to
buy? We
have not thought about opening up alternatives of that
nature.
Q: But I
mean, the reason you're evaluating how many
you're going to buy -- is that capability being
offset in some
way? Is
something else doing that job? That's
what I don't
understand.
ALDRIDGE:
No. The situation is that the
world changes.
(Laughs.)
We -- things happen, and we are taking a look at --
well, if we're going to spend our taxpayer dollars
in the right
way, a year or two ago, there was a study done
that said you
probably need -- more than a year or two ago;
several years ago
-- you need 700 F-22s, because they we're going to
replace the
F-15 on a one-to-one basis. Well, that number got
changed --
"Well, we don't need that many." The QDR [Quadrennial Defense
Review] of 1997 says we only need 331 or something
of that
nature.
Now we're saying, well, now we've started the Joint
Strike Fighter.
It's got stealth capability, got some
air-to-air capability. Do we need all 331? And I
-- you know,
what is the right number, given the new
environment, given the
new priorities, given the fact that we've got a
budget that
looks pretty good, in terms of its current
projection, but is it
going to be the same as you go out in the future?
And we've started a lot of stuff that has a
tendency to
have a huge bow-wave effect. And are we spending our money,
given the fact that we -- right, given the fact
that we may not
have the same amount of funding in four or five
years from now.
So I think this is what's in the equation. It's just, try to
recycle.
Yeah. All
the way in the back.
Q: Mr.
Secretary, a question on spectrum allocation:
There's been some criticism that it hasn't been
considered
enough in developing new weapon systems. Can you respond to
that? And
what's being done to give greater consideration to
it?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, spectrum is important, but fortunately,
this is outside of my area. That belongs to John Stink.
Q: But
it's part of acquisition, though. It's
something you have to --
ALDRIDGE:
Yes, we have to take into account the
spectrum process, but you know, how we do it --
I've really
said, that's John Stenbit's expertise. I got enough to do, to
tell you honestly. (Laughs.)
Yeah, right here.
Q: You
mentioned tankers before. And as you
know,
there's been concerns raised in Congress about the
leasing of
tankers, as opposed to direct purchase. Can you talk about what
benefit you see in some cases of the leasing
versus direct
purchasing and if the cost of the lease field
exceeds that of
the direct purchase? You know, in your analysis, would you mix
the tanker deal?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, leasing will always exceed the
purchase, because -- if you've ever leased a car,
you know the
answer to this question. If we're going to have a tanker, and
it's going to last, you know, 30 years, it is much
better for us
to go buy it than it is to lease it. But what the advantage is
essentially what happens in any corporation; it's
called cash
flow. We
can get by with a lot less money for leasing today
than we would if we went out and purchased it. And
what happens
is that after a period of 14 -- 12, 14 years, the
lease cost
will start to exceed -- will certainly start to
exceed what you
would've paid for the same airplane. But you can get by and buy
that capability much sooner. You can get it in a few years, and
without a huge amount of investment. And what the Air Force has
to do is trade those two things off. They have cash flow
problems and other things. And of course then the other issue
that we have to address is Congress says then
after a period of
lease, you have to give them back to the
contractor. Well,
there's not a whole lot of commercial application
for tankers at
this point, so why would you do that? And why would -- why
would the company want to do that? I think what they're hoping
for is that they'll have -- they'll get a lease
and they'll
continue on for 20, 30 years, which is a good deal
for the
company.
It's not such a good deal from a total point of view
for the military.
Yeah.
Q: On the
H-1 program, I believe you said that the
reason you're continuing is the alternatives would
be more
costly. Is
that the only reason?
ALDRIDGE:
No.
Q: And
also, what alternatives would there be?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, there's two. The H-1 has
two versions.
One's the Huey version; the other's Cobra. And what they're
doing is they're remanufacturing the back end to
have those two
aircraft, through the engines and the rotors and
tail rotors, to
be common.
So there's a great logistics benefit from having
commonality of the two approaches.
From a utility point of view, you could do the
H-60s.
They're a little more expensive, but you could do
that. But
from an attack version, the only other option for
attack is
Apache, which is, I think, twice as expansive as
the Cobra.
So -- and then you look in -- put into the kitty
that
if, "Well, if I do a utility version over
here, and I do the
attack version, then I'm not going to get the same
logistic
support and the economies of scale." So if you put all those
together, it is better for us to go down the
combined path.
And we did put in a new management system, a new
systems
engineering capability at Bell for this program,
and it looks
like that they've -- a whole new management
structure as a
matter of fact. I think like 12 of their top
people have been
replaced to make a --
Yeah.
Q: Mr.
Secretary, one of the reasons for going forward
with the DDX program and the CGX program is that perhaps the
fleet as we know it in surface ships has not
reached the end of
its survivability concept with current
design. Given that as a
given, how would you view the future of the
aircraft carriers as
we know them?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, I think anybody who challenges the
value of the aircraft carrier has to go to
Afghanistan and look
at what value it was. I think the -- the Defense Science Board
just finished a study of the carrier, of the
future of the
carrier. I
have not seen that yet. In fact, I
asked for them
to do that study for lots of the reasons you just
-- you
mentioned.
Where is the carrier going?
But from the point of view of the kind of
capabilities
you can get from air-delivered weapons off of the
decks of the
carrier, it has to be pretty well demonstrated in
Afghanistan.
Now, for the future, if we get the Joint Strike
Fight
STOVL [Short Take-Off & Vertical Landing]
version works well,
maybe the future carrier doesn't have a wire. And any
large-deck carrier becomes essentially an
aircraft-deliverable
system.
So I have an open mind about the future of the
carrier.
I think there is value to it, but we have to put
all that into,
you know, how long it takes, how much it costs,
what are our
alternatives, and so forth. So right there, I don't have a real
answer.
Yeah?
Q: A quick
follow-up. The survivability aspect of
it.
I mean, will it carry a battle group, as you see
it, protect a
carrier into the short-term future, as you see the
threat?
ALDRIDGE:
I believe that's the case.
Again, you have
to figure out what's the threat you're trying to
think about,
but the getting into littoral areas, the role of
ballistic
missiles and high- speed cruise missiles, but the
studies I've
seen of aircraft carrier survivability really give
it a very
high -- high case.
Yeah?
Q: Sir,
earlier on the Osprey you said there had been a
lot of concern about hiding of some test
results. Do you think
that the companies held back test results from the
Defense
Department, or what -- what are you saying?
ALDRIDGE:
What I was talking about is things -- I
wasn't here, so I'm reading what I know about it
more in the
press, that there were those in the Marine Corps
who suppressed
some of the data about reliability and safety
because it didn't
make the airplane look good. And that's what I was speaking of
--
Q: The
guys at the squadron?
ALDRIDGE:
Yeah. In fact, you know, they
placed their
careers at risk because they wanted to show the
airplane to be
performing better than it actually did. So that was what I was
speaking of.
Q: Can we
ask you to step back from these questions for
half a minute and just -- how do you get a --
ALDRIDGE:
Why? (Laughs.)
Q: How do
you get a weapon cancelled in this town?
ALDRIDGE:
It's very hard.
Q: I mean,
they're already at battle stations on the
Crusader. If you want to cancel "weapon
X," do you have any
magic bullets?
I mean, we've had two secretaries of Defense
that tried to cancel the V- 22; they got
rolled. Is there any
new technique you've got in mind to get this thing
cancelled?
(Scattered laughter.)
ALDRIDGE:
It is the hardest thing to do, to take a
weapon out of a program -- out of the budget. It is just so
easy to put one in. I could have just as easily tell the
Missile Defense Agency, "Go do a new Navy
Area." Nobody would
have questioned that one second. And I would -- we
would be
spending hundreds of millions of dollars and
nobody would ever
have said a word.
And take one away? Well, we did the Navy Area.
Jeez,
they thought I had, you know, killed
somebody. And I got a lot
-- and even restructuring a program, like
SBIRS-Low; I mean, I
caught hell over that. You can -- it's just hard, it really is.
Q: How are
you going to get it done?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, in Navy Area I did.
Nunn-McCurdy is a
good tool.
If a program is sick, it's going to run into a
Nunn-McCurdy problem, and so there's a tool
available. The tool
is available during the budget process, during the
-- you know,
some of these -- in the DPG we could have written,
"terminate
this and terminate that," and it would have
happened. But it is
very hard.
Q: I just
had a clarification and a question. The
clarification is on the F-22. You said you were informed of the
structural problem around December. Was that before or after
the Defense Acquisition Board? And then the question is, the
SBIRS-high, is the schedule slipped down?
ALDRIDGE:
Well, let me answer the easy -- yeah, the
schedule has been adjusted. What we've done with SBIRS-high is
that we have a cost estimate that looks -- and
independent
estimates have come in and said the schedule looks
very
aggressive, so we've adjusted the cost and the
schedule to be a
little more executable. But I have let the Air Force say, if
they believe they can accelerate the schedule
within the dollars
that are provided, they're authorized to do
so. Why not? I
mean, if we can get things up earlier, that's
great. But we
have put together what I believe is an executable
program with a
schedule that is somewhat relaxed, higher
probability of being
achieved; but if the program managers, which they
say they feel
comfortable they may be able to move some of that
up within the
dollars, they can do so.
Q: Sir,
the Block 4-A missile that went away along with
Navy Area that you've said would be --
ALDRIDGE:
Block 4. It's the Block 4
missile, not the Block 4-A.
Q: Okay.
ALDRIDGE:
It's an air defense capability.
It doesn't
have as good a kill probability as the Block 4-A
would be, but
we think we can do some things to it to get the
kill probability
up. And if
we can do that, it will absorb a lot of the
shorter-range capability that was lost. There's a lot more work
to be done in this area to make sure that's going
--
Q: In
addition to the extended AAW [air to air weapons]
mission, if you take that on as well.
ALDRIDGE:
Yes. Yes.
Yeah, right here, the lady.
Q: The
Chinook. What alternatives did you look
at?
And what did you ask Boeing to change in the
program?
ALDRIDGE:
For what?
Q: For
Chinook.
ALDRIDGE:
For CH-47?
Q:
Yeah. I've got so many things
running in my mind
about the Chinook. One, we did the CAIG estimate for the cost.
Boeing's program description -- their management
was pretty
good, so we didn't have much to do about that
one. The --
(pause) -- I think the main thing was the cost. We
adjusted the
cost number to take the CAIG, CAIG estimate. And that's what
brought the confidence that they could deliver the
airplane.
And of course, we looked at the alternative, which
was a
heavy-lift helicopter. The only solution was the CH-53, which
is about two or three times more expensive than
the Chinook. So
the alternatives didn't look attractive. The
program, basically
we need a heavy-lift helicopter. And as long as the costs now
would come under control, I was pretty confident
that Boeing
that was going to bring in -- the management
schemes they've got
at Boeing looked pretty good to me.
Yes, right here.
Q: You
referred to earlier about the battlefield of the
future.
Can you just talk in general about the role of UAVs on
that battlefield, and then in particular about the
specific
programs in the services for UAVs? How are they going? And how
much money do you expect that --
ALDRIDGE:
UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] are getting a
lot of attention.
In Afghanistan they're pretty much
battle-proven now. Some of those who were skeptical about the
value of UAVs have gone away. The services have a wide variety
of UAVs, from the Army's Shadow to the Predator,
the Global
Hawk.
DARPA has two programs underway, one for the Air Force
and one for the Navy, new UCAVs [unmanned combat
aerial
vehicles].
DARPA also has some work going in micro-UAVs. I
mean, everybody's got a UAV concept now
going. The Navy at one
time had a UAV helicopter called Fire Scout, I
believe. That was
terminated.
But there are new technologies going.
In fact, one
of the things that looks very attractive is this
new Canard
roto-wing concept that the Navy has for a vertical
takeoff and
lift. But
once it gets rolling, it actually goes jet speed.
So it has speed and vertical takeoff and landing. It's very
attractive as a potential UAV candidate.
I went to the Singapore Air Show as a guest of the
Singapore government and looked at the displays at
all these
foreign countries. Everybody has a UAV. (Laughs.)
Everybody.
Q: As far
as the -- (inaudible) -- ramping up on the UAVs across the board --
ALDRIDGE:
Yes that's the -- we're accelerating Predator
and Global Hawk, making sure Global Hawk has
improved power and
sensors. Basically, Global Hawk's going to replace
the U-2. One
day, that'll be about the same capability.
Q: And
finally, on UCAVs, Senator Warner a couple of
years back talked about a third of combat aircraft
can be
replaced with UCAVs. I mean, do you think that's a possibility
over the next decade and a half? Or is that --
ALDRIDGE:
I don't know if a third is the right number,
but one could certainly imagine the tac-air
[tactical air]
support to a theater being consisting of F-22s and
air cover,
Joint Strike Fighters going in and going after
mobile targets
and UAVs going together. And in fact, in Aviation Week, we --
there's a thing about the French having the
back-seater of one
of their aircraft controlling four UAVs in kind of
a swarm.
We're looking at the same thing as a
possibility. So it makes
sense.
Yeah, Tony.
Q: (Off
mike) -- policy, can I --
ALDRIDGE:
What is it?
Q: A
profit policy.
ALDRIDGE:
Profit policy.
Q: You
spoke a number of times about the need to make
certain profit rates here comparable to the
commercial sector.
Do you have anything in the works right now to
actually convert
your view to a --
ALDRIDGE:
Right. Yes, there's work in
view, and I
don't know -- one of these days, I'll find out
where it -- I'll
tell you about where it is. I just -- I get swamped with other
things, and that tends to get a little bit working
in the staff,
and they don't tell me about it. Most times I get these issues
of Crusader and things of that nature.
Q: But it
is going to be --
ALDRIDGE:
It is in the works. It's what's
called
"weighted guidelines." And one of the things we want to look at
the weighted guidelines is how does one calculate
the fees for
various kinds of contracts? And one of the things I want to
remove out of that is that facilities is part of
the equation
that allows companies to make high profitability
-- make profit,
and so that's an incentive for them not to get rid
of excess
capacity, because they get fee on top of their --
and somehow
the weight's wrong. And we need to make sure we do that right.
Let me go back just -- here, right here. Yeah.
Q: I just
want to ask you a broader question, about
transformation, because I've heard Admiral
Cebrowski saying on
numerous occasions that military transformation,
it means
preparing for warfare in the information age. And I'm wondering
if that means -- in terms of acquisition, does
that mean --
(inaudible) -- investment in the information
technology and
telecommunications sector, I suppose, to the more
traditional
industrial-base types of activities.
ALDRIDGE:
It does mean that, but I would say it's much,
much broader than that, as well. I use this example too many
times: A
guy on a horseback with a GPS [global positioning
system] receiver calling in B-52s for close air
support is kind
of a transformational thought, in my view. And yet it was all
legacy systems.
But it was a different use of the systems that
we have rather than something new and different,
new in
technology.
But I think it is -- it also is new in -- new
technology because it allows you to do things in a
much more
effective way than you did in the past.
But transformation -- and I've used this many
times --
is a journey.
We're never going to get there.
It's -- because
transformation today will be different than
transformation of
tomorrow.
And so I think we have a -- kind of a -- I think
Admiral Cebrowski's view is -- he said that. I think I've heard
him say it's much broader, and I agree with him,
it's much
broader.
Yeah, right here.
Q: On
SBIRS-High, you may have had a different -- you
may use the same words, I'm just using different
words -- it's
the same thing. Do you plan any kind of
restrictions on
SBIRS-High now that you've certified it? And are there any kind
of concerns, particularly to the HU or GEO
payloads?
ALDRIDGE:
There are no restrictions from the point of
view that -- no.
We've certified to the four criteria.
We've
got a restructured program. It's been priced. It's going into
the Air Force budget with the new numbers, with
the new
schedule.
They have to come back with an updated program plan
that puts all that together. I've asked for a review in about
six months to see how well they're doing. I'd like to see the
-- have the cost trends started to make any
difference in
direction.
But as you know, in the space business, we've
transferred that responsibility from Milestone
Decision
Authority to Mr. Teets as the undersecretary of
the Air Force.
So since I had gone through the certification
process, because I
am the only one who has been delegated that
responsibility for
SBIRS-High, we're going to start moving some of
the program day
to day activities over to Mr. Teets for that, and
he'll have the
next one.
Yeah, right here.
Q:
Yeah. The EA-6B replacement
study is out, yet there
have been some talks -- like, the Air Force is
saying that it's
a nice study, but it didn't go far enough, just
talking about
aircraft replacement. What is your feeling of that study?
ALDRIDGE:
They need to make a decision -- (laughs) --
rather than continue to study something.
There are some interesting things in there. What we've
asked the Air Force and the Navy to do is get
together and go
figure out a plan, because we're going to have to
-- we can't
afford two different airplanes for the two
services. There's
going to be an integrated EA- 6B replacement of
some type. And
if we can get the Air Force and the Navy together
to figure out
what that ought to be, that's the right answer.
Yeah, Ray.
Q: Mr.
Secretary, a common denominator in each of the
programs that you mentioned in the letter that you
sent to the
Hill on Nunn- McCurdy was that you were going with
the CAIG
estimate.
ALDRIDGE:
Yes.
Q: Is that
significant? If so, why?
ALDRIDGE:
The CAIG estimates traditionally -- and I
have lots of years. I -- back -- I worked for PA&E in 1967 when
we first started the CAIG -- usually within about
2 percent of
the actual cost of a program when it's
finished. The service
estimates are anywhere between 17 and 19 percent
low. I'd
rather go with a program that I have a little more
confidence
in, even though it's not perfect. And there will be some
changes to it.
In fact, the CAIG's been 2 percent low -- it
hasn't been high -- on the average. And so I think it is better
to take an independent look where people who have
data that goes
far beyond the individual program managers, they
see all of
these programs of all the services, of all the --
and they have
a lot more data in which to make an assessment of
what they
believe the cost is really going to be. I feel more comfortable
taking that estimate than I do taking the service
estimate,
although in some cases I've taken the service
estimate when I
thought it was better. In fact, that's what we did with the
F-22. We
just bought the number of airplanes we could buy at
the CAIG number.
So I felt if I had a -- if I want to tell somebody
that
I have properly priced the program, I have a tool,
and I'm going
to use that tool.
It's called CAIG. And if I feel
that there's
a huge difference in the cost between a service
and the CAIG, I
want to use the CAIG, because we are more likely
to come in at
that cost.
And the combination that -- I've made this speech
before -- the combination of evolutionary spiral
development
that gets something to the field quicker, with
less risk,
coupled with properly pricing programs -- I can't
think of any
better way to maintain stability in a program than
those two
events.
STAFF:
Thank you.
ALDRIDGE:
Okay.
Q: Thank
you very much, Mr. Secretary.
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