Academy of Sciences concluded that advances in biotechnology,
coupled with the difficulty in
detecting nefarious biological activity, have the potential to create a
much more dangerous biological
warfare (BW) threat. The panel noted:
The effects of some of these engineered biological
agents could be worse than any disease known to man.
The genomic revolution is pushing biotechnology
into an explosive growth phase. Panelists asserted that the resulting
wave front of knowledge will
evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex, and widely available to the
public that traditional
intelligence means for monitoring WMD development could prove
inadequate to deal with
the threat from these advanced biological weapons.
Detection of related activities, particularly the
development of novel bioengineered pathogens, will depend increasingly
on more specific human
intelligence and, argued panelists, will necessitate a closer—and
perhaps qualitatively different—
working relationship between the intelligence and biological sciences
communities.
The Threat From Advanced BW
In the last several decades, the world has witnessed a knowledge
explosion in the life sciences based on an
understanding of genes and how they work. According to panel members,
practical applications of
this new and burgeoning knowledge base will accelerate dramatically and
unpredictably:
As one expert remarked: “In the life sciences, we
now are where information technology was in the
1960s; more than any other science, it will revolutionize the 21 st
century.”
Growing understanding of the complex biochemical pathways that underlie
life processes has the potential
to enable a class of new, more virulent biological agents engineered to
attack distinct biochemical
pathways and elicit specific effects, claimed panel members. The same
science that may cure some of
our worst diseases could be used to create the world’s most frightening
weapons.
The know-how to develop some of these weapons already exists. For
example:
Australian researchers recently inadvertently
showed that the virulence of mousepox virus can be significantly
enhanced by the incorporation of a
standard immunoregulator gene, a technique that could be applied to
other naturally occurring
pathogens such as anthrax or smallpox, greatly increasing their
lethality.
Indeed, other biologists have synthesized a key
smallpox viral protein and shown its effectiveness in blocking critical
aspects of the human immune
response.
A team of biologists recently created a polio virus
in vitro from scratch.
According to the scientists convened, other classes of
unconventional pathogens that may arise over the
next decade and beyond include binary BW agents that only become
effective when two components are
combined (a particularly insidious example would be a mild pathogen
that when combined with its antidote
becomes virulent); “designer” BW agents created to be antibiotic
resistant or to evade an immune
response; weaponized gene therapy vectors that effect permanent change
in the victim’s genetic makeup; or
a “stealth” virus, which could lie dormant inside the
This report was prepared by the Office of Transnational Issues.
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victim for an extended period before being triggered. For
example, one panelist cited the possibility of a
stealth virus attack that could cripple a large portion of people in
their forties with severe arthritis,
concealing its hostile origin and leaving a country with massive health
and economic problems.
According to experts, the biotechnology underlying the development
of advanced biological agents is
likely to advance very rapidly, causing a diverse and elusive threat
spectrum. The resulting diversity of
new BW agents could enable such a broad range of attack scenarios that
it would be virtually impossible
to anticipate and defend against, they say. As a result, there could be
a considerable lag time in developing
effective biodefense measures.
However, effective countermeasures, once developed, could be leveraged
against a range of BW agents,
asserted attendees, citing current research aimed at developing
protocols for augmenting common
elements of the body’s response to disease, rather than treating
individual diseases. Such treatments
could strengthen our defense against attacks by ABW agents.
Implications for Warning
The experts emphasized that, because the processes, techniques,
equipment and know-how needed for
advanced bio agent development are dual use, it will be extremely
difficult to distinguish between
legitimate biological research activities and production of advanced BW
agents.
The panel contrasted the difficulty of detecting
advanced bioweapons with that of detecting nuclear weapons, which has
always had clear surveillance
and detection “observables,” such as highly enriched uranium or
telltale production equipment.
Consequently, most panelists argued that a qualitatively different
relationship between the
government and life sciences communities might be needed to most
effectively grapple with the future
BW threat.
They cited the pace, breadth, and volume of the evolving bioscience
knowledge base, coupled with its
dual-use nature and the fact that most is publicly available via
electronic means and very hard to track,
as the driving forces for enhanced cooperation. Most panelists agreed
that the US life sciences research
community was more or less “over its Vietnam-era distrust” of the
national security establishment and
would be open to more collaboration.
One possibility, they argued, might be early
government assistance to life sciences community efforts to develop its
own “standards and norms”
intended to differentiate between “legitimate” and “illegitimate”
research, efforts recently initiated by
the US biological sciences community.
A more comprehensive vision articulated by one
panelist was for the bioscience community at large to aid the
government by acting as “a living sensor
web”—at international conferences, in university labs, and through
informal networks—to identify
and alert it to new technical advances with weaponization potential.
The workshop did not
discuss the legal or regulatory implications of any such changes. 2